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No. 20070117

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THOMAS PECK, aka Thomas Joseph Peck,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, and the UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL,
Defendants/Appellants,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Defendants-appellants State of Utah and the Utah Highway Patrol,
collectively, "Highway Patrol," submit this reply brief in support of their
interlocutory appeal from an order denying their motion for judgment on the
pleadings.
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ARGUMENT
Because "place of legal confinement" is not limited to a
physical facility or building, the Highway Patrol is
statutorily immune from Peck's negligence claim.
For purposes of immunity, "place of legal confinement" means the area
to which Peck was confined in front of the patrol car. Nothing in the subject
statute or case law limits the meaning to a physical facility or building. See
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (West 2004) (providing an exception to the
waiver of immunity if the injuries arose out of, in connection with, or
resulted from "the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or
city jail, or other place of legal confinement.") Peck does not dispute that he
was incarcerated, so immunity turns on whether he was in a "place of legal
confinement."
The definition of "place" is "an area with definite or indefinite
boundaries, a portion of space; a room or space." The American Heritage
Dictionary (4th ed. 2000) (online version http://www.bartleby.com). The
definition of "confinement" is "the state of being physically contained
within some type of boundary." State v. Burgess-Beynon, 2004 UT App.
312, f 9, 99 P.3d 383. Applying those definitions here, Peck was required to
stand in a "place" - in front of the patrol car. Further, Peck was required to
-2-

stand still and to face the patrol car and was thus physically contained within
some type of boundary. Nothing in the language or spirit of either definition
limits "place of legal confinement" - as Peck argues - to a building or
physical facility. Accord Emery v. State, 26 Utah 2d 1, 483 P.2d 1296, 1297
(1971) (noting that "place of legal confinement" obviously applies to more
than jails or prisons).
Moreover, respecting the nearly identical phrase "place of
confinement," the Court of Appeals determined that phrase does not solely
refer to buildings or physical facilities. Burgess-Beynon, 2004 UT App. 312,
112. In that case, interpreting a criminal statute that prohibited damaging a
"place of confinement," the court held that the back seat of a patrol car was a
"place of confinement." Id. The court's analysis is instructive here because
when the same words or phrases are used in more than one legislative
enactment, they have the same meaning. 73 Am. Jur.2d Statutes § 149
(Supp. 2007); see also Spring Canyon Coal Co., v. Indus. Comm 'n of Utah,
74 Utah 103, 277 P. 206, 212 (1929).
In Burgess-Beynon, police officers arrested the defendant for driving
under the influence of alcohol. She was taken into custody and placed in the
back of the arresting officer's car. Id. at 12. The defendant kicked out the
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rear window of the car and was subsequently charged with violating Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (2002), which provides, "A person who willfully, and
intentionally breaks down, pulls down, destroys, floods, or otherwise
damages any public jail or other place of confinement is guilty of a felony
of the third degree." Id. atfflf2, 6 (emphasis added). The trial court
determined that "other place of confinement" was not limited to a building
by the phrase "public jail" that preceded it. Instead, read in context, the
phrase applied to the patrol car as well. Id. at Tf 5. The defendant entered a
conditional guilty plea and appealed to the Court of Appeals. Id. at \ 4.
Defendant argued, like Peck in this case, that "other place of
confinement" was limited to a "jail, prison, or other penal facility" where
"an accused is committed as an inmate." Id. at | 8. The Court of Appeals
rejected that argument and held that the plain language of the statute was not
so limited. Id.
The Burgess-Beynon court recognized the "fundamental principle of
statutory construction (and... of language itself) that the meaning of a word
cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in
which it is used." Id. at f 7 (quoting State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311,313 (Utah
1995)). The court defined confinement and determined that "reading, 'other
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place of confinement' in context (... then), it seems consistent that the
statute applies to places of confinement controlled by a governmental
authority and used in the detention of suspected criminals." Id. at f 9.
Applying the reasoning of Burgess-Beynon here, Peck was arrested
and told to stand still in the area just in front of the patrol car while the back
was cleared out for him. He was thus in an area that had defined boundaries
and that was controlled by a governmental authority. That bounded area was
being used as a temporary substitute for the patrol car until it was ready to be
occupied. Because Peck would have had freedom to move after being put in
the back seat, the degree of his confinement was arguably greater outside the
patrol car where he was told to stand still and face the car. If the back seat
of a car is a place of confinement under Burgess-Beynon, when ordered to
stand still in front of and face the patrol car, Peck too was put in a "place of
legal confinement."
Peck also argues that the government should be immune only after an
arrested person is brought inside a law enforcement building because the
government controls the environment there. Applying that logic here, Peck
must concede that the Highway Patrol is immune from suit because its
control over Peck in the limited confines in front of the patrol car was much
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greater than the degree of control that government has in prisons, jails, and
police stations where criminals are exposed to each other and the physical
aspects of the facilities.1
Peck further contends that the Highway Patrol seeks to expand
immunity to all injuries associated with an arrest. Not so. Although people
who have been arrested have restrictions placed on their movement, they are
not generally required to stand still, directly in front of and facing a patrol
car. Because the restrictions on Peck were greater than those of the typical
arrestee, the Highway Patrol does not advocate immunity in all cases or
arrest. This case merely falls within circumstances described by the statute
and should therefore result in immunity.
Because the Highway Patrol's immunity is retained, it cannot be liable
for Peck's injuries allegedly caused by the troopers' negligence. The trial
court erred when it denied the Highway Patrol's motion to dismiss and
motion for judgment on the pleadings.

1

The high degree of the Highway Patrol's control is highlighted by its
authority to arrest others if they had entered the area directly in front of the patrol
car where Peck was told to stand. See American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2002
UT 131, T[ 11, 63 P.3d 675 (refusing to step away from area where suspects were
being detained violates Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(3), prohibiting interference
with a detention by "another person's refusal to refrain from performing any act
that would impede" the detention).
-6-

CONCLUSION
The Highway Patrol retains its immunity from suit for Peck's negligence
claims. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's denial of the
Highway Patrol's motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the
pleadings and dismiss Peck's suit with prejudice.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this Z£>^ day of August 2007.

Peggy E. Stone
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Attorney for Appellants State of Utah
and Utah Highway Patrol
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